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INTR ODUCTI ON
The United States has turned away immigrants infected with the
human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV") under the public health ex
clusion of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA")1 since the
mid-1980's.2 Since Congress codified the HIV exclusion in 1993,3 any
* The author would like to thank the attorneys at the HIV Law Project in Manhattan
for helping to conceptualize this project and Professors James Hathaway and Nina
Mendelson for their insightful comments.

1. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1 101-1525 (1994 & Supp. 1999). The
public health exclusion, found in 8 U.S.C.§ 1182(a)(l)(A), states that immigrants who have
a "communicable disease of public health significance" are inadmissible. It is one of several
grounds of inadmissibility found in the INA. Prior to 1993, the Secretary of Health and Hu
man Services had the discretion to decide which communicable diseases should render aliens
inadmissible.
2. As discussed in Part II.A infra, the Public Health Service added acquired immune
deficiency syndrome ("AIDS") to the list of dangerous contagious diseases excludable under
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alien applying for an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa, adjustment of
status to lawful permanent resident, or refugee status must first have a
blood test for HIV.4 The HIV exclusion is not absolute, however. Each
HIV-positive alien can apply for one of two waivers of the HIV exclu
sion that are available in the INA. When an alien applies for immi
grant or permanent resident status, he must disclose his HIV status on
the application and, if he is HIV-positive, may simultaneously apply
for a waiver of the exclusion. The first waiver, available to general
immigrants under the INA, requires the immigrant to have an imme
diate family member in the United States who is a citizen or lawful
permanent resident.5 The idea behind this requirement is that family
members will help to care, financially and otherwise, for HIV-positive
relatives, thus relieving the financial burden on the government. The
second waiver, available for "special" immigrants such as refugees,
gives the Attorney General discretion to waive the exclusion "for hu
manitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in
the public interest."6 In other words, this humanitarian waiver is rethe INA in 1987. See Peter A. Barta, Note, Lambskin Borders: An Argument for the Aboli
tion of the United States Exclusion of HIV-Positive Immigrants, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 323,
327 (1998) (describing the adoption of the AIDS exclusion).
3. Pub. L. No. 103-43, 107 Stat. 122, 210 (1993). As a result of the 1993 Amendment, the
INA declares inadmissible any alien "who is determined (in accordance with regulations
proscribed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services) to have a communicable disease
of public health significance, which shall include infection with the etiologic agent for ac
quired immune deficiency syndrome." 8 U.S.C.§ 1182 (a)(l)(A)(i) (1994).
4. See 42 C.F.R.§ 34.3(b) (1999) (discussing the requirements for serologic HIV testing
of immigrants).
5. See 8 U.S.C.§ 1182(g) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999):
The Attorney General may waive the application of
(1) subsection (a){l){A){i) in the case of any alien who {A) is the spouse or the unmarried son or daughter, or the minor unmarried lawfully
adopted child, of a United States citizen, or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent resi
dence, or of an alien who has been issued an immigrant visa, or
(B) has a son or daughter who is a United States citizen, or an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, or an alien who has been issued an immigrant visa . . .
-

.

6. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3) (1994). This section, which permits HIV waivers for certain
refugees and asylees, reads:
(T]he Attorney General may waive (the public health exclusion] with respect to such an
alien for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public
interest. Any such waiver by the Attorney General shall be in writing and shall be granted
only on an individual basis following an investigation.
Although the waiver articulated above is found in the refugee provision of the INA, it is
reiterated in other sections of the INA that deal with special immigrants, such as the Chinese
Student Protection Act. Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-404, 106
Stat. 1969. Because this waiver is available "to assure family unity," it implicitly encompasses
applicants who would qualify for the familial relationship waiver. Thus, even though an ap
plicant cannot apply for both waivers, this waiver is broader, including applicants who would
qualify under either waiver. See Rebecca Kidder, Note, Administrative Discretion Gone
Awry: The Reintroduction of the Public Charge Exclusion for HIV-Positive Refugees and
Asylees, 106 YALE L.J. 389, 400-03 (1996) (discussing the different waivers of the HIV exclu
sion available under various provisions of the INA).
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served for groups of immigrants whom Congress allows into the
United States for humanitarian reasons. Which of the two waivers an
immigrant can apply for depends on what type of immigration status
he is seeking, because different waivers are available for aliens apply
ing under various sections of the INA. When a new immigration law is
enacted, Congress or the Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") must decide which waiver should be available to HIV-positive
immigrants applying under the new provision.7
The INS recently had an opportunity to decide which of these two
waivers should apply to newly enacted legislation. Congress passed the
Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997
("NACARA")8 and the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of
1998 ("HRIFA"),9 which allow Haitian, Cuban, and Nicaraguan immi
grants and illegal aliens who have been in the United States since
December 1995 to adjust their status to that of lawful permanent resi
dent.10 The humanitarian purpose of these laws, as this Note discusses,
was to recognize and respond to the unique situations of these indi
viduals who fled particularly horrific political conditions in their home
countries by allowing them to reside permanently in the United
States.11 NACARA and HRIFA (hereinafter "the Acts") constitute
7. The INA includes all immigration laws. When a new immigration law is enacted, it
enters the U.S. Code as an amendment of the INA, codified in 8 U.S.C. When Congress is
silent on which waiver should apply to a new provision, the INS must decide which waiver is
appropriate through rulemaking procedures.
8. District of Columbia Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, Title II (Nicaraguan
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act), 111 Stat. 2160, 2193 (1997) (amended by
Pub. L. No. 105-139, 111 Stat. 2644 (1997)). While NACARA appears in the 1999 Supple
ment to the United States Code as an amendment to 8 U.S.C. § 1255, this Note uses the
public law citation.
9. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-277, Title IX (Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998), 112 Stat. 2681,
2681-538 (1998). While HRIFA appears in the 1999 Supplement to the United States Code
as an amendment to 8 U.S.C. § 1255, this Note uses the public law citation.
10. Although both NACARA and HRIFA included a filing deadline of April 1, 2000,
members of both the House and Senate introduced bills to extend the deadline, since the
INS's final regulations in response to the Acts did not come out until March 24, 2000. See
146 CONG. REC. S617-19 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2000) (introduction of S. 2058 by Sen. Graham);
146 CONG. REC. E64 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2000) (statement of Rep. Meek). The Senate
Judiciary Committee approved the legislation to extend the deadline on April 13, 2000. See
Michael Posner, Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans May Get New Residency Status Deadline,
THE NATIONAL JOURNAL, COMMITfEE MARKUPS AND VOTES THuRSDAY, APR. 13, 2000
(describing the Senate Judiciary Committee markup of S. 2058). Since the 107th Congress
began in January 2001, a bill extending the deadline of HRIFA and NACARA has already
been reintroduced in the House and referred to the House Judiciary Committee. Central
American and Haitian Adjustment Act of 1999, H.R. 348, 107th Cong. (2001).
1 1. See DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1998, S. PRT. 106-23, at 657-68 (Haiti) (1999) (discussing ongoing human rights abuses in
Haiti); DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1997, 105
CONG., at 481-94, 591-601 (Cuba and Nicaragua) (1998) (discussing ongoing human rights
abuses in Cuba and Nicaragua); see also IRWIN P. STOTZKY, SILENCING THE GUNS IN HAITI:
THE PROMISE OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1997); Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, lmmigra-
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exceptions to the general adjustment of status provision under the
INA, in that they grant permanent resident status to applicants even if
they are inadmissible for many reasons, including illegal entry and po
tential financial burden on the govemment.12 Applicants under the
Acts are still subject to some of the inadmissibility provisions that are
barriers to adjustment of status, including the HIV exclusion.
In regulations adopted pursuant to the Acts, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service requires HIV-positive applicants under the
Acts to apply for the waiver of the HIV exclusion that is dependent on
the applicant's immediate family relationship with a United States citi
zen or permanent resident.13 The INS regulations with respect to waiv
ers of the HIV exclusion do not allow HRIFA and NACARA appli
cants to apply for the waiver for humanitarian reasons available to
other HIV-positive refugees and special immigrants.14 Seemingly, it
would be easier for HIV-positive applicants to assert humanitarian
reasons for the INS not to deport them in their waiver applications
than to prove the requisite family relationship because HRIFA and
NACARA constitute Congress's recognition that the United States
should not send these applicants who have been living in the United
States since 1995 back to Haiti, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Thus, the INS
effectively chose the waiver with more difficult requirements for HIV
positive applicants to meet.
tion Challenges and Opportunities in a Post-Transition Cuba, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 234
(1998).
12. The Acts allow for adjustment of status for an alien who "is otherwise admissible to
the United States for permanent residence, except that, in determining such admissibility,
the grounds for inadinissibility specified in paragraphs (4) [public charge], (5) [labor certifi
cation], (6)(A) [aliens previously deported], (7)(A) [documentation requirements], and 9(B)
[guardians accompanied excluded persons] of section 212(a) [of the INA] shall not apply."§
902 (a)(l)(B), 112 Stat. at 2681-538 (HRIFA). The same language is included in NA CARA.
§ 202 (a)(l)(B), 111 Stat. at 2193.
13. 8 C.F.R.§ 245.13 (c) (2000) (NA CARA); 8 C.F.R.§ 245.15(e)(2) (2000) (HRIFA).
These regulations refer HIV-positive applicants seeking waivers of excludability to a section
of the C.F.R. that requires applicants subject to the public health exclusion to have a quali
fying familial relationship with a United States citizen or permanent resident. See 8 C.F.R.§
212.7(4)(b)(l) (2000) (authorizing a waiver under § 212(g) of the INA, which requires a
family relationship). See also Adjustment of Status for Certain Nationals of Haiti, 65 Fed.
Reg. 15,835 (Mar. 24, 2000) (introducing the Final Rule for both NA CARA and HRIFA,
eight days before the statutory filing deadline).
14. In its discussion of its final rule for HRIFA, the INS addressed comments it received
relating to which waiver should be available for HIV-positive applicants under HRIFA. The
IN S rejected the possibility of allowing the humanitarian waiver for HIV-positive applicants,
concluding that this waiver only applied to the adjustment of status of refugees under 8
U.S. C. § 1159, and that the INS did not have the statutory authority to adopt the humani
tarian waiver here. See Adjustment of Status for Certain Nationals of Haiti, 65 Fed. Reg. at
15,837. As this Note argues, the IN S misconstrued the legislative intent behind the Acts and
their position within the INA as a whole. The INS did, however, open the possibility that
HIV-positive Haitians who were paroled into the United States for the purpose of receiving
medical treatment could be given a discretionary waiver. See 8 C.F.R.§ 245.15(e)(2) (2000).
It is unclear how this discretion would help Haitians without qualifying family members,
however, since the familial relationship is mandatory to obtaining such a waiver.
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This Note considers the appropriateness of the INS's HIV waiver
regulations under HRIFA and NACARA. Courts generally afford
administrative agency interpretations of statutes great deference un
der the Chevron doctrine, unless the agency regulation is contrary to
legislative intent.15 Chevron requires courts to review administrative
actions under a two-pronged analysis to determine whether the
agency's regulation is an abuse of its congressionally delegated discre
tion.1 6 Under the first prong, a reviewing court determines if Congress
clearly addressed the precise question; if it did, and the agency regula
tion does not match Congress's clear intent, the agency abused its ad
ministrative authority.17 If Congress's intent is not clear, the court
turns to the second prong of Chevron, under which it must defer to the
agency's construction of the statute as long as that construction is
permissible.18
Subsequent courts have clarified what "clear" intent under the first
prong entails, determining that legislative intent need not be clear on
the textual surface and that courts may look beyond the text of the law
to determine whether Congress's intent was clear.19 The Supreme
Court has adopted a holistic approach to statutory construction, which
requires courts to look beneath the surface of the statute to divine
legislative intent.20 The Fourth Circuit in Brown & Williamson To-

15. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
16. See id. at 842-43.
17. See id. ("First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.") (citation omitted). In a footnote following the previous quotation, the Court
clarified that intent should be determined through the traditional tools of statutory construc
tion:
The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject ad
ministrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent. . . . If a court,
employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an inten
tion on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.
Id. at 843 n.9 (internal citations omitted).
18. See id. at 843 ("If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly ad
dressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction
on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the stat
ute.") (citations omitted).
19. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 2071, 2091 (1990) ("The Court's own decisions, however, suggest that the mere fact of
a plausible alternative is insufficient to trigger the Chevron rule."). But see Antonin Scalia,
Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 520 (arguing
that a statute should be regarded as ambiguous when "two or more reasonable, though not
necessarily equally valid, interpretations exist").
20. See Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 519 U.S. 465, 475 (1997) (dem
onstrating through its reasoning that courts should consider "the history of evolving congres
sional regulation in the area"); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (reasoning
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bacco Corporation v. FDA synthesized the Court's "holistic approach"
to statutory construction as involving four considerations: 1) the plain
language of the statute; 2) the overall statutory scheme; 3) legislative
history; and 4) a consideration of other relevant statutes.21
If, after conducting this multi-faceted analysis under the first prong
of Chevron, a statute is still ambiguous with respect to a specific issue,
courts move on to the second Chevron inquiry: whether the agency's
regulation is based on a permissible construction of the statute.22 Am
biguity arises only after a reviewing court has looked for Congress's
specific intent using all of the traditional tools of statutory construc
tion: plain language, context and structure of the statute, and legisla
tive history.23 Although courts generally give agencies more discretion
if the statute is ambiguous,24 the regulation must still be reasonable "in

that "Act[s] of Congress should not be read as a series of unrelated and isolated provi
sions"); United States Nat') Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455
(1993) (instructing courts to " 'look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and
policy' " (citing United States v. Boisdore's Heirs, 8 How. 113, 122 (1849))); Dole v. United
Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 35 (1990) (" 'On a pure question of statutory construction . . .
[o]ur starting point is the language of the statute,'. . . but 'in expounding a statute we are not
guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole
law, and to its object and policy.' ") (citations omitted); United Savings Ass'n of Tex. v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (characterizing statutory
interpretation as a "holistic endeavor": "A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is
often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . ."); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (utilizing the "ordinary canons of statutory construction," including the
statutory language, its congruence with the international treaty, and the legislative history).
21. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 162-63 (4th Cir. 1998),
affd, FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
22. See supra note 18.
23. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) ("The plainness or ambiguity
of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in
which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole."); NLRB v.
United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) ("On a pure question
of statutory construction, our first job is to try to determine congressional intent, using 'tra
ditional tools of statutory construction. ' If we can do so, then that interpretation must be
given effect, and the regulations at issue must be fully consistent with it.") (citation omitted);
Cont') Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("[W]e are
not persuaded that Congress's intent is clear within the meaning of Chevron. That is to say,
our employment of the traditional tools of statutory interpretation has left us in doubt as to
what Congress had in mind on the precise issue at hand.").
24. See Cont'/, 843 F.2d at 1453-54:
[I]t is elementary in administrative law that, at least where Congress's intent is unknown, an
agency's interpretation (if reasonable) is entitled to deference from the Article III branch.
This notion is premised on the very nature of our system of government, with its time-tested
separation of governmental powers. . . . To depart from the culture of deference (again, as
always, where Congress's specific intent on the question at hand is unclear) is to do violence
to basic structural principles relied upon by Congress and the President in creating the
agency in the first instance and endowing it with powers to interpret, administer and enforce
that portion of the law of the land.
See also Sunstein, supra note 19, at 2105 ("On the question of reasonableness, it seems clear
that the agency must be given considerable latitude. But this is not to say that the agency
may do whatever it wishes.").
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light of the language, legislative history, and policies of the statute."25
The reasonableness inquiry includes an examination of the agency's
textual analysis of the statute, including its analysis of legislative his
tory, and a determination of the compatibility of the agency's interpre
tation to the congressional purposes behind the statute.26 If the regula
tion is contrary to Congress's policy goals in enacting the statute, a
court will find that it is not a reasonable interpretation of the law and
thus an abuse of administrative discretion.27 In performing this analy
sis, courts must consider Congress's goals in light of the legislative his
tory of the statute, including compromises between competing goals.28
This Note utilizes this holistic approach to statutory construction
to argue that the INS regulations regarding the HIV exclusion under
the Acts are contrary to clear congressional intent and thus an abuse
of administrative discretion. This Note further argues that even if the
intent of Congress is not clear and the Acts are ambiguous as to waiv
ers of the HIV exclusion, the INS's regulations for HIV-positive appli
cants are unreasonable in light of Congress's humanitarian purposes in
enacting HRIFA and NACARA. Part I examines the plain language
of the Acts, concluding that because Congress did not explicitly ad
dress the HIV exclusion in the Acts, it is necessary to look elsewhere
to determine legislative intent concerning this issue. Part II discusses
Congress's intent behind the Acts and the HIV exclusion itself, con
cluding that the most important reason behind the HIV exclusion cost - is not relevant under HRIFA and NACARA. Moreover, be
cause Congress intended to create an unprecedented immigration
remedy in response to political unrest in these countries, the adminis
trative regulations under the Acts should reflect the congressional goal
of giving the applicants - even the HIV-positive ones - special
treatment. This discussion of legislative intent is relevant both to show
Congress's clear intent under Chevron prong one and to evaluate the
25. Republican Nat'! Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 76 F.3d 400, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(quoting Natural Res. Def. Council v. United States EPA, 822 F.2d 104, 111 (D.C. Cir.
1987)). See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 392 (1999) (vacating an FCC rule
because of the agency's unreasonable interpretation of the statute).
26. See Cont'/, 843 F.2d at 1449 ("In our view, reasonableness in this context is to be de
termined by reference both to the agency's textual analysis (broadly defined, including
where appropriate resort to legislative history) and to the compatibility of that interpretation
with the Congressional purposes informing the measure.").
27. See id. at 1452 (" 'Reasonableness' in this context means, we are persuaded, the
compatibility of the agency's interpretation with the policy goals (as carefully identified in
the manner previously described) or objectives of Congress.").
28. See id. at 1451 ("(P]recision of goal identification must be the order of the day. . . .
(T]he goal (or more precisely, the competing and conflicting goals) must be identified with
care and respect for the compromise-laden legislative process."); see also Republican Nat'/
Comm., 76 F.3d at 406 ("Examining again the statute and its legislative history, we find no
basis for questioning the reasonableness of (the regulation at issue]. As we have already con
cluded, nothing in the statute or its legislative history limits the Commission to requiring a
single request, or precludes the Commission from requiring a follow-up.").
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INS's reasonableness under prong two. Part III considers the INS
regulations in light of other relevant immigration statutes and Con
gress's overall statutory scheme for immigration law. A consideration
of relevant statutes is useful in evaluating the regulations under both
prongs of Chevron. Part III argues that because the INS treats HIV
positive applicants differently under HRIFA and NACARA than un
der other immigration laws based on similar legislative purposes, the
INS violated Congress's intent to give HRIFA and NACARA appli
cants the same protection as applicants under analogous laws. This
Note concludes that the INS should voluntarily change the waiver re
quirements in its regulations; courts should find the waiver regulation
to be an abuse of administrative discretion and vacate the rule; or
Congress should amend the law to specify that the humanitarian
waiver is available for HIV-positive applicants.29
I.

THE PLAIN L ANGUAGE OF NACARA AND HRIFA

The first step in statutory interpretation is to look at the plain lan
guage of the statute.30 Because the Acts do not mention the HIV ex
clusion or waiver explicitly, the plain language of the Acts does not
conclusively demonstrate Congress's clear intent with respect to HIV
positive applicants. As mentioned above, the Acts allow Haitian,
Nicaraguan, and Cuban nationals who have been continuously present
in the United States since December 1995 and are otherwise admissi
ble to adjust their status to permanent resident.31 Applicants are not

29. Although both NACARA and HRIFA include a clause that limits the judicial re
view of a decision by the Attorney General as to whether or not the status of any alien
should be adjusted under the Acts, the Supreme Court has distinguished between judicial
review of an administrative action on a particular case and judicial review of an administra
tive regulation under an act of Congress generally. See Bowen v. Michigan Acad. of Family
Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986). In terms of the legislative reform solution, it is worth noting
that the Central American and Haitian Parity Act of 1999, which was introduced in the Sen
ate, included technical amendments to NACARA and HRIFA. Among the amendments
was a provision that would grant the Attorney General discretion to waive the public health
exclusion for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the
public interest. See 145 CONG. REC. S10944-45 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Durbin concerning the bill, S. 1592). The last legislative action on this bill was in September
1999, when it was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. The Central American
and Haitian Adjustment Act of 1999, which was reintroduced in the House in January 2001,
would likewise amend the HIV waiver under NACARA and HRIFA. Central American
and Haitian Adjustment Act of 1999, H.R. 348, 107th Cong. (2001).
30. See Carninetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("It is elementary that the
meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is
framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of the law
making body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its
terms."); see a/so NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 81-83
(5th ed. 1992).
31. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
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required to have been paroled32 or admitted into the United States,
which means they need not have entered the country legally. The key
phrase in the Acts relevant to the HIV exclusion is that applicants
must be "otherwise admissible," which indicates that the grounds for
inadmissibility of immigrants under the INA (including the HIV ex
clusion) apply to HRIFA and NACARA applicants.33 The Acts ex
plicitly waive some of the inadmissibility grounds, including the likeli
hood of becoming a public charge, failure to obtain a labor
certification, entering the country illegally, and violating documentary
requirements for entry.34 The Acts do not waive the HIV exclusion,
however, and do not specify which waiver should be available for
HIV-positive applicants; in fact, the Acts do not mention HIV or the
public health exclusion at all.
Another interpretation of the Acts might conclude that the plain
language is quite clear: Congress explicitly waived other inadmissibil
ity grounds in the Acts, indicating that the legislators considered each

32. Parole is an executive power used in part to accommodate large numbers of refugees
temporarily. Since the adoption of the Refugee Act of 1980, the Attorney General has used
parole to allow large groups of "refugees" into the United States who do not meet the tech
nical refugee definition under the Act but should be allowed to stay temporarily for "urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (Supp. V
1999). Many HRIFA and NACARA applicants were paroled into the United States, al
though it is not a requirement in the Acts. Because parole is only effective for a certain
amount of time, when it expires, the parolee can be returned automatically unless the Attor
ney General extends the deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(d) (2000) .
33. The Acts allow for adjustment of status for an alien who "is otherwise admissible to
the United States for permanent residence, except that, in determining such admissibility,
the grounds for inadmissibility specified in paragraphs (4) [public charge exclusion], (5) [la
bor certification requirement], (6)(A) [aliens previously deported], (7)(A) [documentation
requirements], and 9(B) [guardians accompanying excluded persons] of section 212(a) [of
the INA] shall not apply." Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropria
tions Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, Title IX (Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of
1998), Div. A, § lOl(h), (a)(l)(A), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-583 (1998); Nicaraguan Adjustment
and Central American Relief Act, District of Columbia Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
105-100, Title II (Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act), tit. III, 111
Stat. 2160, 2193 (1997) (amended by Pub. L . No. 105-139, 1 1 1 Stat. 2644 (1997)).
34. See statutory references supra note 33; see also INS Sets Application Procedures for
Nicaraguans and Cubans Under NACARA, 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 724, 725 (1998).
The INS explicitly undermines the public charge waiver in its informal instructions to HIV
positive HRIFA applicants on its website, by attempting to add a public charge requirement
to HIV-positive applicants seeking waivers of the HIV exclusion. The INS website, under
"Questions and Answers about HRIFA," includes the following information about HIV
positive HRIFA applicants:
Individuals must apply for a waiver under Section 212(g) of the INA. To be eligible an alien
must have a qualifying family relationship and also demonstrate that:
Their illness will not pose a danger to the public health of the United States;
The possibility of the spread of infection is minimal; and
Their illness will not result in any cost being incurred by any government agency with
out prior consent of the agency.
•

•

•

Questions and Answers, at <http://www.ins.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/questsans/HRIFAQA.
htm> (last visited Sept. 10, 2000).
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of the inadmissibility grounds in deciding which ones to waive, and
thereby made a conscious decision not to waive the HIV exclusion.
This maxim of statutory interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio al
terius,35 dictates that where the legislature enumerates items that are
excluded from the law, the items not listed should be assumed not to
be excluded.36 While the expressio unius maxim makes logical sense, it
must be used with caution. Because the maxim looks only to the text
and organization of the statute to determine legislative intent, it
should not be relied upon if other tools of statutory interpretation,
such as looking to the legislative history and purposes behind the stat
ute, indicate that Congress's intent was otherwise.37 Here, Congress's
explicit waivers of other grounds of inadmissibility shed light on its
priorities. Notably, the Acts waive the exclusion of immigrants who
could someday become a "public charge" (i.e., a financial burden on
the government), demonstrating that Congress was willing to ignore
the financial risk of allowing potentially costly immigrants into the
country - the major impetus behind Congress's adoption of the HIV
exclusion in 1993.38 Additionally, the complete waiver of the public
charge inadmissibility undermines the need for the familial relation
ship waiver of the HIV exclusion. The requirement of an immediate
family member in the United States is financially motivated, rooted in
Congress's effort to ensure that there is someone other than the gov
ernment to take care of HIV-positive immigrants medically and finan
cially. The humanitarian waiver seems more appropriate, given Con
gress's humanitarian - rather than fiscal - priorities evidenced on
the face of the Acts and, as discussed in Section 11.B, in the legislative
history. Thus, a brief look below the surface of the Acts indicates that
the expressio unius argument is not dispositive of Congress's intent in
this situation.
Moreover, the expressio unius argument is only powerful as a re
sponse to an argument for waiving the HIV exclusion entirely; if
Congress intended the Acts to eliminate the exclusion, it would have
done so explicitly when it waived other provisions. The issue in this
Note, however, is not whether Congress intended to eliminate the
HIV exclusion entirely, but which waiver of the HIV exclusion should
be available to HRIFA and NACARA applicants. In the Acts, Con-

35. Defined as: "the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990).
36. See SINGER, supra note 30, at 216-17.
37. See id. at 234 ("(I)n the usual circumstances the application of the maxim is subordi
nated to the basic rule of statutory construction that the intent of the statute prevails over
the letter."); see also Bums v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991) ("An inference drawn
from congressional silence certainly cannot be credited when it is contrary to all other tex
tual and contextual evidence of congressional intent.").
38. See infra Section H.B.
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gress is silent on the issue of which waiver of the HIV exclusion should
be available. One might infer that this silence indicates that Congress
intended the waiver requiring a family relationship, which is found in
the general inadmissibility section of the INA and applied to all gen
eral immigrants as a default. But legislative silence is not a dispositive
indicator of legislative intent. 39 The text of the Acts, in terms of the
permanent immigration relief they provide to a large number of refu
gees, does not support the INS requirement that HIV-positive appli
cants must have an immediate family member who is a United States
citizen or permanent resident. Instead, the plain language of the Acts
sheds light on Congress's broader purpose of providing widespread
humanitarian relief, and the INS should have recognized this purpose
and chosen the waiver for humanitarian reasons.
The arguments above indicate that the plain language of
NACARA and HRIFA can be interpreted both ways on the issue of
which waiver should be available for HIV-positive applicants. But the
holistic approach to discerning Congress's clear intent under the first
prong of Chevron does not end with plain language or the absence
thereof.40 Because the statutory language is ambiguous, further exami
nation of the legislative history of the Acts and the HIV exclusion and
the structure of the Immigration and Nationality Act is necessary to
discern Congress's clear intent under the first prong of the Chevron
analysis.41
II.

UNDERSTANDING THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NA CARA

AND

HRIFA IN LIGHT OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE HIV
EXCLUSION

A consideration of the legislative history behind NACARA and
HRIFA in light of the legislative history behind the codification of the

39. See, e.g., Nat'!. Rifle Assoc. of Am. v. Reno, 216 F.3d 122, 129 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
("Heeding the Supreme Court's recent warning, '[w]e do not rely on Congress's failure to
act' as dispositive evidence of congressional intent.") (citation omitted); Brown v. Secretary
of Health & Human Servs., 46 F.3d 102, 108 (1st Cir. 1995) ("[N]onaction by Congress is or
dinarily a dubious guide . . . . " (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 1 15, 121 (1983))).
40. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 162 (4th Cir. 1998),
affd, FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
41. Courts should refrain from looking at the broad purposes of legislation when the
plain language of a specific provision of a law is unambiguous. See Trustees of the Chicago
Truck Drivers (Independent) Pension Fund v. Leaseway Transp. Corp., 76 F.3d 824, 830 (7th
Cir. 1996). When the plain language is ambiguous, however, courts should look to the legis
lative history of the law. See Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v.
Robinson Cartage Co., 55 F.3d 1318, 1323 (7th Cir. 1995). Importantly, the ambiguity of the
statutory language does not automatically indicate that Congress's intent was not clear in
terms of the Chevron analysis. In other words, ambiguous language does not push the analy
sis from Chevron prong one to Chevron prong two; rather, courts look beyond the statutory
language to determine if Congress's intent was clear. See also Sunstein, supra note 19.
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HIV exclusion of immigrants reveals that Congress viewed the finan
cial reasons underlying the HIV exclusion as subordinate to its policy
reasons for NACARA and HRIFA. Section II.A discusses Congress's
policy reasons for enacting the HIV exclusion, demonstrating that the
legislative history highlights the primary policy priority as a financial
one. Section II.B discusses the legislative history of the Acts, which
indicates that Congress intended the Acts to provide humanitarian re
lief for immigrants who fled horrific conditions and should not be
forced to return home. Additionally, the Acts reflect Congress's deci
sion to further the United States' international foreign policy priorities
in Nicaragua, Cuba, and Haiti and to provide immigration relief re
gardless of the cost. This Part concludes that, given Congress's intent
to grant widespread immigration exceptions to Nicaraguans, Cubans,
and Haitians for both diplomatic and humanitarian reasons, the INS's
strict waiver policy for HIV-positive HRIFA and NACARA appli
cants (which focuses on avoiding costs) undermines congressional in
tent. The INS should have recognized this humanitarian legislative in
tent and chosen the more appropriate waiver of the HIV exclusion
available under the INA - the waiver based on humanitarian reasons.
A.

Congress's Policy Reasons Behind the HW Exclusion

To determine whether the INS's regulations concerning HIV
positive applicants under HRIFA and NACARA are consistent with
congressional intent, it is necessary to consider the legislative intent
behind Congress's creation of the HIV exclusion in immigration law
generally. As the Supreme Court has directed, one level of holistic
statutory construction under Chevron is a consideration of relevant
statutes.42 The HIV exclusion, which is part of the INA, is relevant be
cause every new immigration statute that requires applicants under it
to be admissible, including HRIFA and NACARA, subjects appli
cants to the HIV exclusion. This section examines the legislative intent
behind the HIV exclusion, concluding that the primary reasons Con
gress originally passed it in 1993
financial and political concerns,
not public health concerns - are not important under HRIFA and
NACARA, because these Acts demote monetary concerns to secon
dary status. This section then discusses Congress's intention to treat
refugees differently than other immigrants with respect to the HIV ex-

42. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting that acts of Congress
"should not be read as a series of unrelated and isolated provisions"); United Sav. Ass'n v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (statutory interpretation is a
"holistic endeavor" that includes an examination of the statute's full text, its structure, and
the subject matter); United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64 (1940) ( '(A)ll acts in pari ma
teria are to be taken together, as if they were one law' " (quoting United States v. Freeman,
3 How. 556, 564 (1845))); Brown & Williamson, 153 F.3d at 162.
"
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clusion, concluding that, by analogy, HRIFA and NACARA appli
cants should be treated differently as well.
Although the United States has excluded aliens with communica
ble diseases since the beginning of modern immigration law, the justi
fication behind the exclusion has evolved from public health concerns
to monetary and political concerns. The history of the public health
exclusion goes back to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
which declared immigrants who were infected with "any dangerous
contagious disease" inadmissible.43 It was the responsibility of the
Public Health Service ("PHS") (within the Department of Health and
Human Services ("HHS")) to determine which diseases should be in
cluded on this list. In 1987, the PHS added AIDS to the list.44 In re
sponse, the Senate unanimously passed an amendment requiring the
PHS to substitute HIV for AIDS on the list. This quick congressional
response, at a time when Senators knew very little about this relatively
new and mysterious virus, was a sign that the HIV exclusion was to be
a politically charged issue, born out of fears of the American elector
ate, rather than a reasoned scientific response to a health risk.45 Con
gress diminished the impact of this amendment when it passed the
Immigration Act of 1990,46 which replaced "dangerous contagious dis
ease" with "communicable disease of public health significance" and
granted authority to the Secretary of HHS to determine which dis
eases fit this definition.47
The permanent codification of the HIV exclusion was the result of
a long political battle.48 As scientists learned more about HIV, HHS
realized that the virus was communicable only through certain behav
iors, not by casual contact like tuberculosis (the type of disease the
public health exclusion was designed to prevent), and in 1991, Secre
tary of HHS, Dr. Louis Sullivan, proposed that HIV be removed from

43. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212, 66 Stat. 163, 182 (1952).
44. Barta, supra note 2, at 326.
45. See Elizabeth Mary McCormick, Note, HIV-Infected Haitian Refugees: An Argument
Against Exclusion, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 149, 157 (1993) ("The decision to act in this area
may well have resulted from the belief that the rapid spread of this 'new' disease in the
United States, coupled with fear and ignorance of the public about how it was spread, called
for drastic measures."). Senator Helms led the charge for this amendment. See id.
46. Pub.
U.S.C.).

L.

No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 8

47. 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(l)(A)(i) (1994).
48. In the debates over the codification of the HIV exclusion, Senator Simpson postu
lated that the reason Congress wanted to take away the HHS Secretary's authority to deter
mine which diseases were of public health significance was because HIV "has become now a
political football . . . . I have a feeling that that is exactly what this is, under the pressure of a
political campaign and a political response and a political payoff." 139 CONG. REC. 2,870
(1993) (remarks of Sen. Simpson).
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the list.49 This proposal received a negative response from many con
seratives in Congress and members of the general public.50 President
Clinton took part in the debate as well, expressing his intention to
eliminate the HIV exclusion shortly after taking office.51 Republicans
in Congress responded by initiating an amendment to the National In
stitutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993 that provided that HIV
would permanently constitute a "communicable disease of public
health significance" under the public health exclusion.52
The primary concern reflected in the congressional debates over
this amendment was the enormous cost of treating HIV-positive im
migrants.53 Editorials on the subject also focused on the financial bur
den on taxpayers.54 One of the strongest arguments against the fiscal
rationale behind the amendment was that the HIV exclusion was not
necessary to prevent the costs to taxpayers because the INA already
contained an exclusion of immigrants who were likely to become
public charges.55 The amendment's supporters rejected this response,
perhaps because the issue had become so highly politicized.
49. Sullivan's reasoning for the proposed removal of HIV from the list of communicable
diseases was:
The risk of (or protection from) HIV infection comes not from the nationality of the in
fected person, but from the specific behaviors that are practiced. Again, a careful considera
tion of the epidemiological principles and current medical knowledge leads us to believe that
allowing HIV infected aliens into this country will not impose a significant additional risk of
HIV infection to the United States population, where prevalence of HIV infection is already
widespread. Our best defense against further spread of HIV infection, whether from a U.S.
citizen or alien, is an educated public.
McCormick, supra note 45, at 160 (quoting Medical Examination of Aliens, 56 Fed. Reg.
2485 (1991)).
50. House Republicans sent a letter to Sullivan, signed by fifty-seven representatives,
urging him to reconsider the proposed rule. Additionally, the HHS received more than
40,000 letters opposing the proposed rule, many from conservative religious groups. In re
sponse to this backlash, the Justice Department tabled the proposal. Barta, supra note 2, at
329-30.
51. Philip J. Hilts, Clinton to Lift Ban on H.J. V.-Infected Visitors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,
1993, at A17. See also Barta, supra note 2, at 335.
52. Pub. L. No. 103-43, 107 Stat. 210 (1993). The amendment was proposed by Republi
can Senator Don Nickles.
53. See 139 CONG. REC. 2,850 (1993) (remarks of Sen. Kassebaum) ("[M]y concern lies
in the area of potential financial costs to an already beleaguered American health system. . . .
[A] single AIDS case is currently estimated to cost about $102,000 over the lifetime of the
patient."). Senator Phil Gramm clarified that the issue was one of fiscal responsibility, not
one of compassion: "First, compassion is what you do with your money, not what you do
with the taxpayers' money; and second, compassion ought to begin at home." 139 CONG.
REC. 2,861 (1993) (remarks of Sen. Gramm).
54. One prominent example came from Republican Senator Don Nickles of Oklahoma:
"HIV persons will be flocking to the United States to have taxpayers pick up their health
care expenses." What Insanity Could Persuade the United States of America to Admit to Its
Shores Immigrants Testing Positive to HIV, the AIDS Virus?, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Feb. 14,
1993, at 10, available at 1993 WL 7973345.
55. See National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, 139 CONG. REC. 3,016
(1993) (statement of Sen. Hatfield):
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The supporters of the HIV exclusion were also concerned with
protecting the health of American citizens, although these concerns
seem somewhat secondary to financial concerns.56 Moreover, these
appeals to public health concerns were undermined by the medical
experts' opinion that HIV does not fit the definition of a "communi
cable disease of public health significance" under the 1990
Immigration Act, because it is not spread through casual contact and
does not put people in public settings at risk.57 Ultimately, the opposi
tion to the amendment from some Democrats, health care providers,
the scientific community, and AIDS advocacy groups was not enough
to ensure its defeat, and the amendment was adopted.58
The primacy of the legislators' financial concern in passing the
HIV exclusion is evident in the waiver of the HIV exclusion available
for general immigrants under the INA. This waiver admits HIV
positive immigrants who have a close family relative who is a United
States citizen or permanent resident.59 The familial connection has
nothing to do with the public health risks posed by the HIV-positive
applicant, but it is relevant to the likelihood that the applicant will not
become a public charge if he has relatives to help finance his medical
bills. The focus on financial concerns in the general waiver gives rise to

I voted to oppose the Nickles amendment [which codified the HIV exclusion] today because
I felt it attempted to make a medical decision for economic reasons. I do not believe Con
gress is the proper authority for making medically and scientifically based decisions of this
nature. The current public charge exclusions more appropriately address the economic con
cerns and provide immigration officials with the basis for excluding those they believe will
become public charges due to their medical conditions. If Congress is truly concerned with
the economic costs associated with new immigrants, I feel it would be more appropriate to
take a closer look at the public charge exclusions, rather than making medical decisions for
political reasons.
139 CONG. REC. 2,855 (1993) (statement of the National Commission on Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome, Washington, DC) ("Public charge provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act require all applicants for immigrant and non-immigrant visas to demonstrate
that they are not likely to become public charges. Anyone who does not do so is denied a
visa and precluded from either visiting or immigrating to the United States.").
56. As Senator Simpson noted, "[HIV] is certainly a contagious disease whose only
prognosis as far as we know - and it is a terrible tragedy - is death, and [it] already affects
1.5 million Americans." But he then went on to characterize the "public significance" of
HIV in terms of medical care expenses: "[A] disease, which has such high medical costs, has
to be of public health significance unless one would argue that health care costs are not of
public health significance." This focus on the high cost of treating HIV indicates that, in
Senator Simpson's opinion, the public health significance of HIV was bound up with its eco
nomic significance. 139 CONG. REC. 2,870 (remarks of Sen. Simpson).
57. These medical experts, from organizations including the Centers for Disease Control
and Health and Human Services, concluded that HIV is "not spread by casual contact,
through the air, or from food, water or other objects, nor will an infected person in a com
mon public setting place another individual inadvertently or unwillingly at risk." 139 CONG.
REC. 2,854 (1993) (news release from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
Jan. 25, 1991).
58. The final vote tally was 76 to 23. 139 CONG. REC. 3,016 (1993).
59. 8 u.s.c. § 1182(g) (2000).
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an inference about which waiver Congress intended for HIV-positive
applicants under NACARA and HRIFA. In these Acts, Congress ex
plicitly waived the public charge exclusion, sending a message that ap
plicants should be admitted under these special statutes regardless of
the possibility of their becoming a public charge.(j() Congress must have
known that applicants were likely to fall under the public charge ex
clusion given the economic and political conditions from which they
fled.61 The waiver of the public charge exclusion demonstrates that
Congress believed that the purpose of the Acts overshadowed its fiscal
concerns. Thus, taking the inference one step further, Congress im
plicitly prioritized the humanitarian and foreign policy purposes of
NACARA and HRIFA over the primarily fiscal purpose of the HIV
exclusion.62 Although Congress probably did not intend to waive the
exclusion entirely, the INS should have looked to the legislative pur
pose behind the HIV exclusion and the public charge waiver within
HRIFA and NACARA to inform its choice between HIV waivers.
Because the INS did not consider the purpose of the HIV exclusion,
which is relevant under both prongs of Chevron, its regulations are
contrary to legislative intent and thus an abuse of discretion.
Another relevant factor in the legislative history of the 1993
amendment codifying the HIV exclusion is Congress's intent to treat
HIV-positive refugees differently than other HIV-positive immi
grants.63 In the debates over the amendment, the Senate discussed the

60. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub.
L. No. 105-277, Title IX (Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998), 1 12 Stat. 2681,
2681-583 (1998); Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, District of Co
lumbia Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, Title II (Nicaraguan Adjustment and Cen
tral American Relief Act), tit. III, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193 (1997) (amended by Pub. L. No. 105139, 111 Stat. 2644 (1997)).
61. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act, Hearing before the Subcomm.
on Immigration of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 10 (1997) (letter to Sen.
Abraham from Alfonso Oviedo-Reyes, Attorney, Nicaraguan Fraternity) ("As you are
aware, Haiti has a fragile economy and it is recovering from the devastating effects of a civil
struggle that required the U.S. to send troops to Haiti in order to bring stability and guaran
tee the rights of the Haitian citizens."); see also DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1998, s. PRT. 106-23, at 658 (1999) (Haiti) ("Haiti is an ex
tremely poor country, with a per capita annual income of about $500. . . . About two-thirds
of the population work in subsistence agriculture, earn less than the average income, and live
in extreme poverty. A small, traditional elite controls much of the country's wealth."); DEP'T
OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1997, 105 CONG., at
591 (Nicaragua) (1998) ("Nicaragua is an extremely poor country. . . . The unemployment
rate was officially estimated at 14 percent, with underemployment reaching 35 percent.");
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE , 1997 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES for 1997,
105 CONG., at 481 (Cuba) (1998) ("[T]he economy remained depressed due to the inefficien
cies of the centrally controlled economic system.").
62. See infra Section 11.B.
63. Under the international refugee definition in the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 152, a refugee is an
individual who, "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, relig
ion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
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situation of HIV-positive refugees as distinct from other immigrants.
Statements by several Senators signify a recognition that the HIV ex
clusion is not absolute, but must yield to other, greater concerns such
as the plight of refugees.64 Comments from members of Congress indi
cate that Congress did not intend to include refugees and other special
immigrants within the blanket HIV exclusion, but intended for the
waiver for humanitarian purposes under the Refugee Act of 1980 to
remain intact.65 The ideas in these statements can be extended by
analogy to HRIFA and NACARA, because as Sections Il.B and 111.B
discuss, Congress enacted the Acts in order to grant quasi-refugee
remedies to Haitian, Nicaraguan, and Cuban immigrants who, like
refugees, fled inhumane conditions.
B.

Legislative Intent Behind NACARA and HR/FA

Under Chevron, courts look to the legislative history of statutes to
determine whether the history clarifies Congress's intent under the
"holistic" method of statutory construction of Chevron prong one66
and, if Congress's intent is not clear, to ascertain Congress's purposes
to decide whether the agency's regulation was unreasonable under
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of
the protection of that country. . . ." The United States signed on to the treaty, adopting the
definition, in the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. See Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 268. The treaty
requires special treatment of individuals who meet the refugee definition.
64. Senator Simpson pointed out that refugees were not subject to the HIV exclusion:
"This amendment does not affect refugees who are admitted under another provision which
allows waivers of medical exclusion." 139 CONG. REC. 2,871 (1993) (remarks of Sen.
Simpson). This statement is not completely true, because the Refugee Act specifies that
refugees and asylees are still subject to the HIV exclusion, although they can apply for a
waiver based on humanitarian purposes and the public interest. See infra Section 111.B.
Interestingly, this debate took place at a time when over 200 HIV-positive Haitians who
had fled their country were being detained in a quarantined camp in Guatanamo Bay. Sev
eral Senators expressed concern about these people being allowed to come to the United
States. But as Senator Simpson pointed out, these Haitians did not meet the definition of
refugee anyway, because many of them fled for primarily economic reasons. Additionally,
the detainees can be distinguished from HRIFA applicants because they were outside the
United States and these debates took place before HRIFA was enacted. The comments are
interesting, however, because they reveal a commonly held belief that a substantial percent
age of Haitians are HIV-positive. See 139 CONG. REC. 2,860 (1993) (remarks of Sen.
Nickles) ("I have heard reports that in Haiti alone, the HIV population may range as much
as 11 percent, and that is a tragedy.").
65. Senator Bob Dole, discussing the waiver authority of the Attorney General, af
firmed that "[n]o one has argued that this waiver authority should be altered." 139 CONG.
REC. 2,866 (remarks of Sen. Dole). See supra note 64 (remarks of Sen. Simpson concerning
the HIV waiver for refugees).
66. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res., Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 851-53 (1984) (looking
to the legislative history of the Clean Air Act to see if Congress's intent was clear on the is
sue); see also Scalia, supra note 19, at 515 ("[I]t seems to me that the 'traditional tools of
statutory construction' include not merely text and legislative history but also, quite specifi
cally, the consideration of policy consequences.").
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Chevron prong two.67 Explicit discussion of the waiver of the HIV ex
clusion in the legislative history is not necessary to ascertain
Congress's clear intent under Chevron prong one. Even if this failure
to discuss the precise issue renders the legislative history unclear un
der the first prong of Chevron, the legislative history sheds light on
Congress's purposes to the extent necessary to determine that the
INS's interpretation of that intent in its regulations was unreasonable
under Chevron prong two.
Congress intended NACARA and HRIFA to provide permanent
immigration relief to Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Cubans fleeing hor
rific situations in their home countries. This section discusses the leg
islative history of the Acts, which demonstrates Congress's humani
tarian purpose. The legislative history of the Acts is relatively scant, as
NACARA was never referred to or discussed in a committee, and
both Acts were eventually passed within large appropriations bills.
But there are enough sources of legislative history to understand
Congress's purposes and policy reasons for enacting NACARA and
HRIFA, including a Senate Explanatory Memorandum, floor testi
mony from the House and Senate debates of NACARA, and a Senate
immigration subcommittee hearing on HRIFA.68 Like the Acts them
selves, none of the legislative history touches on the HIV exclusion is
sue or the available waivers of the exclusion from which the INS might
choose. Nonetheless, the INS had a duty to recognize the humanitar
ian purpose demonstrated in the legislative history, and it should have
chosen the less restrictive humanitarian waiver of the HIV exclusion.
The humanitarian waiver, which takes into consideration humanitar
ian reasons to refrain from sending the HIV-positive applicant back to
his home country, is more appropriate, given that the Acts were based
on an understanding that there are, in fact, humanitarian reasons to
allow these refugees to stay in the United States permanently. This
section
concludes
that
under
both
prongs
of
Chevron, the INS had a duty to recognize Congress's humanitarian in
tent in adopting the Acts and to choose the waiver of the HIV exclu
sion that would better further Congress's goals.
67. See Cont'! Airlines v. Dep't of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("In our
view, reasonableness in this context is to be determined by reference both to the agency's
textual analysis (broadly defined, including where appropriate resort to legislative history)
and to the compatibility of that interpretation with the Congressional purposes informing
the measure.").
68. Both of these documents are appropriate for ascertaining congressional intent. Al
though Committee Reports are generally considered the most authoritative source of legisla
tive intent, committee hearings are considered useful, particularly for insight into Congress's
purpose. Likewise, statements in floor debate, particularly when made by the bill's sponsor,
are indicative of legislative intent. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 709-10, 717-19 (2d ed. 1995); see also Trbovich v. United
Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528 (1972) (construing the statute by relying almost entirely
on statements at Senate hearings by Senator John Kennedy, the bill's sponsor, and his advi
sor).
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Because NACARA was enacted approximately ten months prior
to HRIFA and HRIFA's language was modeled on NACARA, it is
appropriate to look first to the legislative history of NACARA. The
purposes of the bill, as reported in the Explanatory Memorandum re
printed in the Congressional Record, were as follows:
The purpose of this Act is to ensure that nationals of certain specified
countries who fled civil wars and other upheavals in their home countries
and sought refuge in the United States, as well as designated family
members, are accorded a fair and equitable opportunity to demonstrate
that, under the legal standards established by this Act, they should be
permitted to remain, and pursue permanent resident status, in the
United States. In recognition of the hardship that those eligible for relief
suffered in fleeing their homelands and the delays and uncertainty that
they have experienced in pursuing legal status in the United States, the
Congress directs the Department of Justice and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service to adjudicate applications for relief under this Act
expeditiously and humanely.69
This statement of purpose indicates that NACARA was a humanitar
ian measure, intended to give immigrants who fled inhumane situa
tions permanent immigration relief in the United States. The House
floor debates on NACARA support this purpose as well.70 Addition
ally, Congress specifically directed the INS to adjudicate NACARA
applications "humanely."71 The humanitarian waiver of the HIV ex
clusion would have effectuated this mandate, because the waiver re
quires the Attorney General to determine whether there are humani
tarian reasons for the INS not to send the applicant back to his home
country. Congress's statement of purpose recognizes the existence of
such humanitarian reasons, and the INS should have followed
Congress's guidance.
A secondary purpose behind NACARA was administrative con
venience . The statement above mentioned the delays that NACARA
applicants had faced in the processing of their asylum cases, and this
concern was reiterated at other points of the legislative history as
well.72 The concern is a legitimate one; asylum cases require an exten-

69. EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM REGARDING TITLE II
OF THE D.C.
APPROPRIATIONS PORTION OF THE OMNIBUS APPROPRIATIONS BILL SUBMITTED BY
MESSRS. MACK, GRAHAM, ABRAHAM, KENNEDY, AND DURBIN, reprinted in 143 CONG.
REC. Sl2266 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1997 ) [hereinafter EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM ) .
70. See District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 143 CONG. REC. Hl0,678 (daily ed.
Nov. 12, 1997) (statement of Rep. Davis) ("The inclusion of this legislation in the D.C. ap
propriation bill will bring a measure of justice to thousands who have fled oppression in their
native land to seek the freedom and opportunity offered in this Nation.").
71. See EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 69, at Sl2266.
72. See, e.g., EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 69, at S12267 ("[A)pplication
of the foregoing approach would greatly reduce the need for protracted analysis of the more
subjective aspects of the suspension [of deportation) standard, thereby reducing the adminis-
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sive individualized assessment, which is expensive and leaves appli
cants without status as they wait for a resolution.73 But it is notable
that Congress's solution to the administrative problem was to allow all
Nicaraguans and Cubans who had been in the United States since 1995
to become permanent residents, regardless of their potential cost to
society or the likelihood of success in their asylum claims. The solution
Congress chose to the administrative problem indicates that it was
more concerned about providing a quick, permanent resolution and
removing barriers to immigration relief than saving money.
The Senate Immigration Subcommittee hearing on HRIFA indi
cates that Congress was motivated by similar humanitarian concerns
when it passed HRIFA almost a year later. As when enacting
NACARA, Congress was concerned, especially in light of the harsh
deportation requirements enacted in 1996 in the Illegal Immigrant Re
form and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"), that Haitians
who resided in the United States with temporary status might be de
ported. Senator Spencer Abraham, Chairman of the Senate Immigra
tion Subcommittee, elaborated on these concerns in his opening re
marks:
In recent years, many people came to the United States under a legal or
quasi-legal status, fleeing tyrannical regimes that were either enemies of
the United States or allies whose domestic abuses were countenanced
because of the country's strategic significance in the struggles for world
freedom that were going on at the time. I noted during the (NACARA)
debates that retroactive application of the new standards would likely
force some of these people to leave, despite the roots they have laid
down, and the fact that the conditions they were returning to remained
dangerous.74
Senator Abraham's remarks indicate that Congress was motivated by
an unwillingness to send Haitians back to the dangerous situations
they fled in Haiti. As with NACARA, the HIV waiver available to
applicants who could demonstrate that there were humanitarian rea
sons not to send them home would be more appropriate to fulfill
Congress's purpose.
Congress had another purpose in enacting HRIFA that was not
present in NACARA: ensuring that Haitian immigrants were treated
trative burden on the Immigration and Naturalization Service and minimizing further delays
in according relief to these individuals.").
73. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Immigration of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 19 (1997) (statement of
Rep. Dfaz-Balart) ("[T]hese refugees filed asylum petitions, oftentimes during lengthy proc
essing times, for Immigration to evaluate their claims. . . . It is estimated that approximately
4,000 of these asylum claims are still pending.").

74. Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immi
gration, of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2-3 (1997) (statement of Sen.
Abraham).
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fairly by U.S. immigration laws. Members of Congress were acutely
aware of the historic disparate treatment of Haitian refugees in com
parison to other similar groups, most prominently Cubans.75 In light of
the passage of NACARA, members of the Congressional Black
Caucus convinced other members of Congress and President Clinton
that U.S. immigration law should treat similarly situated refugees the
same.76 The legislative history of HRIFA indicates that Congress was
in fact motivated in part by the lack of consistent treatment of refu
gees.77 This secondary motive is relevant to the HIV waiver question
because it indicates that Congress chose to provide widespread immi
gration relief to Haitians through HRIFA, which it had consistently
failed to do previously, so the more lenient HIV waiver is appropriate
to fulfill Congress's intent.
75. In 1994, Representative Carrie Meek proposed a Haitian Refugee Fairness Act that
would have provided Temporary Protected Status to Haitians, thereby relieving the "unfair
ness, inequity and the perception of racial prejudice" that characterized U.S. policy toward
Haitian refugees and asylees. U.S. Policy Toward Haiti: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
103rd Cong. 7 (1994) (testimony of Rep. Meek). Representative Corrinne Brown agreed:
"For too long, Haitian refugees have been treated differently from other refugees, particu
larly Cuban refugees." Haitian Asylum-Seekers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Interna
tional Law, Immigration and Refugees of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong. 68
(1994) (statement of Rep. Brown). Although this bill was not passed, it was a precursor to
the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1 998, which was founded upon the princi
ple of providing the same humanitarian relief to similarly situated refugees.
76. When Congress enacted NACARA in 1997, President Clinton - under pressure
from the Congressional Black Caucus and other groups - finally recognized this prejudice
by ordering a policy of Deferred Enforced Departure, which protected Haitians from depor
tation until legislation comparable to NACARA could be passed. See Clinton Orders De
ferred Enforced Departure for Haitians, 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 2 (1998) ("Like Central
Americans, Haitians for many years were forced to seek the protection of the United States
because of oppression, human rights abuses and civil strife at home. . . . [w]hile we have been
encouraged by Haiti's progress following the restoration of democratic government in 1994,
the situation there remains fragile.") (quoting President Clinton). See, e.g., Haitian Refugee
Immigration Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 3 (1997) (statement of Sen. Abraham) ("U.S. immigra
tion law, in my judgment, should not turn on arbitrary distinctions between members of dif
ferent nationalities."); see also Annette C. Escobar, Note and Comment, Aggravating the
Immigration Paradox: The Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act's Effect
on U.S. Immigration Policy, 11 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 445, 473-74 (1999) (discussing Con
gress's acknowledgment that NACARA inherently discriminated against Haitians).
77. As stated by Senator Kennedy:
[Haitians] endured repression and suffered persecution at the hands of successive govern
ments. Haitians supporting democracy have faced torture, extra-judicial killings, imprison
ment, and other forms of persecution . . . . The call for democracy is being heard around the
world, and America's voice has always been the loudest. How can we advocate democracy
on the one hand, and then deny protection to those who heed our call and are forced to flee
their homeland as a result?

144 CONG. REC. S13003 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1 998) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). See Haitian
Refugee Immigration Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration of the Sen
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 14-15 (1997) (statement of Rep. Conyers) (discuss
ing the inequity to Haitian refugees in NACARA and in the history of U.S. immigration
law's treatment of Haitian refugees in general); id. at 38-40 (statement of Miraan Sa, Am
nesty International) (discussing the ongoing human rights abuses in Haiti).
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The historical context of the United States' immigration policies
toward and relationships with Nicaragua, Haiti, and Cuba indicates
that Congress also had foreign policy reasons for enacting NACARA
and HRIFA.78 In addition to the legislative purposes discussed above,
NACARA and HRIFA represent congressional decisions to provide
special relief above and beyond what is normally available through
United States immigration policy - a recurring theme in diplomatic
relations with these countries. Congress singled out Haitians, Cubans,
and Nicaraguans for preferential immigration treatment to compen
sate for the United States' involvement in - and in some cases, re
sponsibility for - the political situations in these countries.79
NACARA is a continuation of the United States' scheme of spe
cial immigration protection for Cubans over the past several decades
and a reiteration of American disapproval of Communism. The
United States has used immigration policy as a political tool to fight
Communism in Cuba since the Cuban Revolution of 1959 caused a
mass emmigration to the United States.80 Because it viewed the Com
munist regime under Fidel Castro as inherently abhorrent and oppres
sive, the United States was (and is) reluctant to return anyone to such
conditions.81 Coupled with this anti-Communist motive is a humani78. As Senator Kennedy pointed out, "President Clinton and Secretary Albright have
repeatedly stated that it is America's long-standing foreign policy to ensure the continuing
stability and viability of emerging, yet still fragile, democracies in Central America and
Haiti." 145 CONG. REC. Sl0,946 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1999) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) (dis
cussing not the Acts at issue in this Note but the proposed Central American and Haitian
Parity Act, which would amend the Acts discussed here).
79. See Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2-3 (1997) (statement of Sen.
Abraham) ("In recent years, many people came to the United States under a legal or quasi
legal status, fleeing tyrannical regimes that were either enemies of the United States or allies
whose domestic abuses were countenanced because of the country's strategic significance in
the struggles for world freedom that were going on at the time."). Indeed, as Michael Walzer
observed, a government feels the most obligation to assist refugees in two situations: when it
has helped to turn the individuals into refugees by direct involvement in the unrest that has
uprooted them, and when the individuals are persecuted precisely because they are ideologi
cally and/or ethnically similar to its own citizens. MICHAEL w ALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE
49 (1983).
80. Travieso-Diaz, supra note 1 1 , at 251 ("U.S. policy toward Cuba in the last forty years
has been motivated exclusively by the interest of the United States in fighting Communism
and replacing the current Cuban government with a democratic regime.").
81. See The Clinton Administration's Reversal of United States Immigration Policy To
ward Cuba, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Western Hemisphere of the House Comm.
on International Relations, 104th Cong. 1 (1995) (comments of Chairman Dan Burton):
For over 30 years, the United States has had a policy of accepting people who are fleeing
Communist oppression from the island of Cuba. The oppressive policies of the Castro re
gime are known around the world. Not only has Fidel Castro supported violent revolution
around our hemisphere, but he also has assisted in revolutionary organizations in Africa, the
Middle East, and elsewhere.
The recent international custody battle over 6-year old Elian Gonzalez, who fled Cuba and
was rescued in the high seas and brought to America in late 1999, highlighted the fact that
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tarian concern about human rights conditions in Cuba.82 Congress
codified this sentiment in the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966,
which allowed Cubans who were paroled into the United States to
adjust their status to lawful permanent resident after two years, with
out having to surmount the barriers of proving their eligibility for
asylum.83 In fact, the Senate explained that NACARA was modeled
after the Cuban Adjustment Act.84 Cuban refugees continue to receive
special immigration treatment in contrast to other refugees, most no
tably Haitians.85
The United States' immigration remedies for Nicaraguan refugees,
including NACARA, grew out of a sense of obligation resulting from
American involvement in the civil war between the Contras and the
Sandanistas in the 1980s, which drained the Nicaraguan economy and
compelled citizens to seek refuge.86 Congress responded with various

U.S.-Cuba immigration policy is really about the eternal political disagreement between
communism and democracy. See Joseph Contreras, The War Over Elian, NEWSWEEK, Jan.
17, 2000, at 22-25.
82. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 105
CONG., at 481 (Cuba) (1997) ("The (Cuban] Government's human rights record remained
poor. It continued systematically to violate fundamental civil and political rights of its citi
zens.").
83. Cuban Refugees, Adjustment of Status, Pub. L. N o. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1 161 (1966). See
Travieso-Diaz, supra note 1 1 , at 239 n.20 ("Congress in effect decided that because Castro
was Communist, in general no Cubans should be deported."). The administration adhered to
this open door policy even during the infamous Mariel boatlifts of 1980, when approximately
125,000 Cubans fled subsequent to Castro's removal of the exit restrictions at the Mariel
port. See id. at 242. In April 1996, the Senate voted to keep the Cuban Refugee Adjustment
Act intact until Cuba has a democratic government, at which point it will be repealed. See id.
at 250. Haitians have pointed to this open-ended law as evidence of U.S. immigration pol
icy's differential treatment of Haitians and Cubans. See Cheryl Little, Intergroup Coalitions
and Immigration Policies: The Haitian Experience in Florida, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 717, 733
(1999) ("The Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act . . . accounts in large measure for the stark
difference in treatment between the two groups. But what makes this law so remarkable is
that it is open-ended, has no cut-off date, and has not been repealed.").
84. See EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM REGARDING TITLE II OF THE D.C.
APPROPRIATIONS PORTION OF THE OMNIBUS APPROPRIATIONS BILL SUBMITTED BY
MESSRS. MACK, GRAHAM, ABRAHAM, KENNEDY, AND DURBIN, reprinted in 143 CONG.
REC. S12266 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1997).
85. See, e.g., The Clinton Administration's Reversal of United States Immigration Policy
toward Cuba, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Western Hemisphere of the House Comm.
on International Relations, 104th Cong. 2 (1995) (comments of Chairman Dan Burton). Con
trasting Cuban refugees to economic refugees, the Chairman stated:
Now we are confusing people who are fleeing oppression from Castro's Cuba with people
who are coming here for economic reasons . . . . The people who are coming here for eco
nomic reasons from Mexico and elsewhere are not coming because they are fleeing oppres
sion, but rather they are coming here to make a living and we have a terrible problem with
that. However, those who are fleeing for their lives, those who are fleeing to bring their
families to safety out of the horrible conditions that exist in Cuba because of the Communist
terror down there, those who do not want to be thrown into Castro's dungeons, have a right
to be free.

86. Approximately 126,000 Nicaraguans applied for asylum in the United States be
tween 1981 and 1991: "What happened when these various people came to our country was
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special immigration measures, but because none of them provided the
permanent immigration relief that NACARA provided, Nicaraguans
were left in an in-between status - neither permanent residents nor
illegal aliens.s7 When Congress passed IIRIRA in 1996 and the INS
began to apply its deportation provisions retroactively, Nicaraguans
under these programs were in danger of deportation.ss Congress
solved this quandary by enacting NACARA, which provided the per
manent solution necessary to avoid deporting these Nicaraguans and
thus maintain consistency in its policy of providing humanitarian relief
to Nicaraguan refugees.s9 Congress intended NACARA to provide
somewhat different than what happened to others who have come here. . . . Indeed, the ac
tions with regard to the Nicaraguans in particular suggests that the American Government
was actively promoting the notion that those Nicaraguans, fearful of the outcome of these
uprisings, come to America." 143 CONG. R EC . Sl0,199 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1997) (statement
of Sen. Abraham).
87. These legislative responses began with the Nicaraguan Review Program from 1 985
to 1995, which temporarily protected Nicaraguan asylum applicants from deportation while
their asylum cases were under review and allowed rejected asylum-seekers to reapply for
asylum instead of being deported. This reapplication provision essentially allowed
Nicaraguan asylum-seekers an extra level of review. See PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO
CONGRESS TRANSMITTING A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE RELIEF TO CERTAIN
ALIENS WHO WOULD OTHERWISE BE SUBJECT TO REMOVAL FROM THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 105-111, at 1-2; see also 143 CONG. R EC . Sl0,199 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1997);

Linda Kelly, Defying Membership: The Evolving Role of Immigration Jurisprudence, 67 U.
CIN. L. REV . 185, 224 (1998). When the program expired in 1995, the INS encouraged Nica
raguans to apply for suspension of deportation, which was available to aliens who had lived
continuously in the United States for seven years. See id. at 225.
88. IIRIRA replaced suspension of deportation with the more restrictive cancellation of
removal. Cancellation generally requires the applicant to demonstrate: 1) ten years of physi
cal presence in the United States; 2) good moral character during that time; 3) no convic
tions of certain crimes, including crimes "involving moral turpitude"; and 4) "exceptional
and extremely unusual" hardship not to the applicant, but to a U.S. citizen or permanent
resident spouse, parent, or child of the applicant. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l) (Supp. V 1999).
This retroactive application of IIRIRA and the problems it caused for Nicaraguans was the
subject of a class-action suit in a Florida district court. See Tefel v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 623,
650 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (granting preliminary injunction that prevented the INS from deporting
any of the class members or dismissing their applications for suspension of deportation).
This preliminary injunction was vacated and the case remanded by the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in response to the enactment of NACARA, which rendered many of the
class members' claims moot by allowing Nicaraguans to bypass the suspension of deporta
tion process and apply for adjustment to permanent resident status. See Tefel, 180 F.3d at
1293-94; see also Kelly, supra note 87, at 226-27 (discussing the impact of the Tefel case on
legislators' decisions regarding NACARA).
89. Members of the Senate discussed the impact of IIRIRA on Nicaraguans in their
consideration of NACARA. See 143 CONG. REC. Sl0,196-202 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1997).
Senator Abraham summarized the need for consistency in the United States' policy toward
Nicaragua:
[I]n the 1980's, this country actively encouraged people fearing persecution, fearing death
squads, fearing disruptions of their communities to come to America. Then we took extraor
dinary measures to make it feasible for them to stay here, even those who had been denied
asylum through the official asylum-seeking procedures . . . .
143 CONG. REC. Sl0,199-200 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1997). Senator Mack reiterated Senator
Abraham's consistency concerns:
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widespread relief to refugees fleeing a political situation in which the
United States was directly involved.
United States involvement in Haiti in the past decade has primarily
focused on promoting democracy, but this focus has not been as acute
as the obsession with defeating Communism in Cuba.90 When a mili
tary coup cut short the democratically-elected regime of Jean
Bertrand Aristide in September 1991, Haitian citizens fled the vio
lence and poverty that ensued.91 Congress's solution - interception of
Haitians at sea and return to Haiti - although congruent with the
United States' historical treatment of Haitians, differed markedly
from its policy toward Cuban refugees.92 In May 1994, President
Clinton temporarily suspended this direct return policy and instituted
a policy of transporting intercepted refugees to a safe haven on
Guatanamo Bay for processing of their asylum claims.93 But this policy
[I]n essence, we went to bat for [the Central American refugees] in the 1980's to protect de
mocracy and to move them toward freedom and capitalism, and today [they] are still strug
gling in that battle. To send several hundred thousand individuals back into an environ
ment . . . where the unemployment rate is 60 percent, would destabilize those countries,
which would be just the opposite of the effort that we made in the 1980's.
143 CONG. REC. Sl0,201 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1997) (statement of Sen. Mack).
Senator Abraham emphasized this concern again during the hearings on HRIFA:
Unfortunately, various sections of [IIRIRA] . . . have had some perverse impacts on a vari
ety of different fronts that have been, as a consequence, issues to be addressed by those of us
in the 105th Congress. The combination of the changes to the suspension of deportation pro
cedures and the cap of 4,000 per year on those who could be suspended and adjusted, was
together a very devastating set of procedures with regard to people who had been in various
processes seeking to have their status adjusted here in the United States.
Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. On Immi
gration of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2 (1997) (statement of Sen. Abraham).
90. See Malissia Lennox, Note, Refugees, Racism, and Reparations: A Critique of the
United States' Haitian Immigration Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 687, 710-14 (1993) (distin
guishing U.S. treatment of Cuban and Haitian asylum-seekers based on the political bent of
their home countries). As Lennox notes, the United States is more likely to grant asylum to
people fleeing Communist regimes: "Even today, 90 percent of asylees hail from communist
countries." Id. at 711 (citation omitted).
91. Congress considered this election "the most free and fair elections in [Haitian) his
tory." U.S. Policy Toward Haiti: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere and
Peace Corps Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103rd Cong. 1 (1994) (state
ment of Chairman Christopher Dodd). See Elizabeth Kay Harris, Economic Refugees: Un
protected in the United States by Virtue of an Inaccurate Label, 9 AM. U. J. INT' L L. & POL'Y
269, 279 (1993). As Harris discusses, Haitian civilians were subject to unemployment, starva
tion, and constant fear of attack, as "economic conditions become inseparable from political
conditions." Id. at 282.
92. From 1981 to 1991, U.S. policy toward Haitian refugees consisted of using the Coast
Guard to prevent them from reaching the United States. See Lennox, supra note 90, at 70304. After the 1991 coup, the administration introduced a parole process, whereby Haitians
were intercepted at sea and interviewed at Guatanamo Bay. Those who met the threshold
"credible fear" standard for asylum claims were temporary paroled into the United States to
apply for asylum. See 143 CONG. REC. E2,382 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (extension of re
marks of Rep. Conyers).
93. See Susan Martin, Andy Schoenholtz, and Deborah Waller Meyers, Temporary
Protection: Towards a New Regional and Domestic Framework, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 543,
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was short-lived: after U.S. troops returned Aristide to power in
October of 1994, the U.S. government sent the Haitians in Guatanamo
Bay refugee camps back to their homeland, even though members of
the military continued to make Haiti unsafe for Aristide supporters.94
As discussed above, HRIFA represents Congress's acknowledgment
that U.S. immigration policy for Haitians was inconsistent with the
policy for Cubans, given that Congress had similar foreign policy con
cerns about both neighboring countries.
This discussion of the United States' involvement and interest in
Cuba, Nicaragua, and Haiti supports the evidence of legislative intent
found in the legislative history of the Acts. The United States has a
long history of involvement in the political regimes of these countries,
and feels a sense of obligation to its political allies who fled these abu
sive regimes. Congress, recognizing the inhumane circumstances
HRIFA and NACARA applicants fled and the unstable political con
ditions in their home countries, intended the Acts to provide a com
prehensive, humanitarian immigration solution. In addition, wide
spread relief negated the need to evaluate each applicant's asylum
claim individually. When these concerns are compared to the financial
justification behind the HIV exclusion discussed in Section II.A, it
seems that the humanitarian HIV waiver is more consistent with
Congress's intent than the waiver based on familial ties to the United
States. Because the INS did not heed Congress's purposes when
choosing the proper HIV waiver under the Acts, its waiver regulations
are both contrary to legislative intent under Chevron prong one and
unreasonable under Chevron prong two, and thus an abuse of adminis
trative discretion.

554 (1998); STOTZKY, supra note 1 1 , at 37 (discussing Clinton's move as a response to politi
cal pressure from the Congressional Black Caucus and human rights groups). Many of these
people were paroled into the United States after immigration officials determined that they
had a credible asylum claim. HRIFA granted these parolees permanent residence status,
based on a recognition that their asylum claims might not be successful and, even if they
were, might not provide a permanent remedy. See Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act:
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Immigration of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 19 (1997) (statement of Rep. Dfaz-Balart) (stating that of the approximately 11,000
Haitians who were paroled through Guatanamo Bay between 1991 and 1993, 4,000 of their
asylum claims are still pending).
94. See Martin et al, supra note 93, at 555; STOTZKY, supra note 11, at 39-41; see also
U.S. Policy Toward Haiti: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere and Peace
Corps Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103rd Cong. 63 (1994) (testimony
of Holly Burkhalter, Advocacy Director, Human Rights Watch). Ms. Burkhalter discussed
the state of human rights in Haiti in 1994: "Haitians remain in the relentless grip of the mili
tary and armed thugs, who murder, attack, and harass suspected Aristide supporters with
impunity." And although many Haitians sought relief through the U.S. refugee program,
"the sea has proved safer for them than the U.S. Embassy's refugee program." Id.
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INS REGULATIONS UNDER NACARA AND
HRIFA TO OTHER IMMIGRATION LAWS

COMPARING THE

A comparison of NACARA and HRIFA to other immigration
laws demonstrates that Congress intended the Acts to provide perma
nent immigration relief analogous to that available under the Refugee
Act and other special immigration laws contained within the INA.
Special immigrants under these laws can apply for an HIV waiver for
humanitarian reasons, unlike general immigrants, who must apply for
the waiver based on family relationships. The INS chose the latter
HIV waiver in its regulations for NACARA and HRIFA, even though
both waivers were available in the INA and Congress considered
NACARA and HRIFA applicants to be more like special immigrants
than general immigrants. Thus, the INS's HIV waiver is inconsistent
with the structure of the INA as a whole and thereby contrary to leg
islative intent.
Looking to other immigration provisions within the INA is a le
gitimate method to determine legislative intent under the holistic ap
proach to statutory construction. As the Supreme Court advised in
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co. , in determining legislative intent, congres
sional acts "should not be read as a series of unrelated and isolated
provisions."95 Other relevant statutes should be considered along with
them in pari materia. 96 The Supreme Court recently employed this
method in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. ,97 in which it
invalidated the Food and Drug Administration's ("FDA") tobacco
regulations. To ascertain legislative intent, the Court looked beyond
the plain language of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"),
which granted the FDA authority to regulate drugs and devices, to
other congressional statutes regulating the use of tobacco. The Court
considered statutes enacted both prior to and subsequent to the en
actment of the FDCA.98 Other immigration laws are relevant to
NACARA and HRIFA under this analysis, because all of the laws are
included within the INA and newly enacted laws are codified as

95. 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995).
96. Statutes that are

"in pari materia" are " those relating to the same person or thing or

having a common purpose." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 791 (6th ed. 1 990).
97. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
98.

Id.

at 142-58. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, summarized the Court's

holding:
In this case, we believe that Congress has clearly precluded the FDA from asserting jurisdic
tion to regulate tobacco products. Such authority is inconsistent with the intent that Con
gress has expressed in the FDCA's overall regulatory scheme and in the tobacco-specific
legislation that it has enacted subsequent to the FDCA. In light of this clear intent, the
FDA's assertion of jurisdiction is impermissible.

Id.

at 1297.
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amendments of the INA.99 Even if these relevant statutes do not indi
cate Congress's clear intent concerning the HIV waiver under Chev
ron prong one, looking to other statutes is a valid method of discern
ing the reasonableness of the INS's waiver policy under Chevron
prong two.
This Part utilizes the above method to determine the legislative in
tent of NACARA and HRIFA by comparing the provisions and re
quirements of the Acts with other immigration provisions. Section
III.A contrasts the statutory requirements for adjustment of status to
permanent resident under the Acts to the general requirements for
immigrants who wish to adjust their status, concluding that, by delet
ing many of the adjustment requirements for applicants under the
Acts, Congress intended to make it easier for these Haitians,
Nicaraguans, and Cubans to adjust their status to permanent resident.
Section IIl.B compares the statutory and regulatory provisions for
adjustment under the Acts with the provisions for refugee and asylum
status, arguing that the INS's restrictive regulations for HIV-positive
HRIFA and NACARA applicants contradict Congress's attempt to
allow these Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Cubans to bypass the barriers
to qualifying for asylum. Section 111.C analogizes the Acts to similar
ad hoc legislation for immigrants from certain countries, concluding
that because these laws are similar in purpose to NACARA and
HRIFA, the INS should have looked to them to determine which
waiver should be available for HIV-positive HRIFA and NACARA
applicants. This Part concludes that, because Congress intended
HRIFA and NACARA to provide permanent, widespread immigra
tion relief that is more like refugee law and other special immigration
measures than relief available to general immigrants, the INS should
have imitated the HIV waiver available under special immigration
laws rather than the one available under general immigration law.
A.

A djustment of Status for Immigrants Generally

A comparison of the requirements and barriers to adjustment of
status from immigrant to permanent resident in the INA with those in
HRIFA and NACARA demonstrates that Congress intended to allow
applicants under the Acts to bypass many of the barriers to obtaining
a "green card" that most immigrants face. General immigrants apply
ing for permanent residence status must demonstrate that they have
been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States and
must fit into one of the narrowly defined categories of eligibility de
fined by the statute, of which all except immediate family relationships

99. For instance, HRIFA and NACARA were codified as amendments to the adjust
ment of status provision of the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 note (Supp. V 1999).
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are subject to annual numerical limitations.100 In contrast, NACARA
and HRIFA applicants can adjust their status without demonstrating
that they were inspected, admitted, or paroled, which would be diffi
cult for most of the applicants to prove; they must show only that they
have resided in the United States since December 1995.1 01 In addition,
NACARA and HRIFA are not subject to numerical quotas.
More importantly, immigrants seeking adjustment of status under
the general INA provision must be "eligible to receive an immigrant
visa," which means that applicants are subject to all of the grounds for
inadmissibility. 102 In contrast, HRIFA and NACARA automatically
waive many of these grounds, including the exclusion of aliens who are
likely to become a public charge, aliens who have been working in the
United States without authorization or wish to do so in the future, un
documented aliens, and aliens who are unlawfully in the United
States.103 The fact that Congress waived the public charge exclusion for
HRIFA and NACARA applicants indicates a recognition that most of
the Haitian, Nicaraguan, and Cuban applicants were poor, having fled
their poverty-stricken home countries without any of their belongings,
and would either have to work or obtain public assistance at least

100. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1994); MARGARET H. MCCORMICK, The Immigration Sys
tem, reprinted in IMMIGRATION LAW: BASICS AND MORE 5-9 (2000) (discussing the annual
numerical limitations and four categories of eligibility for permanent residence: family rela
tionship, employment relationship or circumstance, lottery based on diversity of country ori
gin, and eligibility for special immigrant status (such as refugee status)). Although these re
quirements may sound simple, they exclude many immigrants who would be included under
HRIFA and NACARA. For example, aliens who enter the United States illegally - without
being inspected and admitted or paroled - are ineligible. Adjustment of Status to that of
Person Admitted for Permanent Residence, 8 C.F.R. § 245.l(b)(3) (1999).
101. District of Columbia Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, Title II (Nicaraguan
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act) § 202(b)(2), 111 Stat. 2160, 2194 (1997); Om
nibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277,
Title IX (Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998), § 902(b)(l), 1 12 Stat. 2681,
2681-538 (1998).
102. 8 C.F.R. § 245.l(a) (1999). These grounds for exclusion include the HIV exclusion
and are found in 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1994).
103. See supra note 12. Indeed, HRIFA and NACARA waive all exclusions except pub
lic health exclusions, exclusions on criminal grounds, security exclusions (e.g., terrorists and
Nazis), the exclusion of draft evaders, exclusions for fraudulence and smuggling, and the ex
clusion against previously removed aliens. This distinction is significant, because the grounds
for inadmissibility that Congress waived generally render many immigrants ineligible for
green cards. Consider, for instance, the employment exclusion: if an immigrant wishes to
work in the United States, the Secretary of Labor must have determined that there are not
enough available workers at the time and place where the immigrant wishes to work and
that the immigrant's employment will not affect the wages or conditions of similarly em
ployed workers - a difficult burden of proof for most immigrants. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)
(1994). The only other option for immigrants is not to work, which would mean that they
would probably soon become welfare recipients, a.k.a. "public charges" (unless they had in
dependent sources of wealth), and would thus be excludable under the public charge exclu
sion.
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temporarily. 104 By waiving these important grounds for exclusion that
apply to most aliens seeking to adjust their status, Congress exempted
Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Cubans from the grounds of exclusion that
were probably most likely to prevent their adjustment of status. The
INS's regulations for HIV-positive applicants undermine Congress's
efforts to make it easier for HRIFA and NACARA applicants to ob
tain permanent residency than for general immigrants, because appli
cants must obtain the same HIV waiver as general "green card" seek
ers.105
B.

A Substitute for Asylum

As discussed in Section Il.B, Congress viewed Haitians,
Nicaraguans, and Cubans who had fled to the United States as refu
gees, and intended the Acts to provide humanitarian relief similar to
that available for refugees - essentially, a substitute for asylum status.
The legislative history behind the Acts indicates that Congress was
motivated by the "refugee-like situations" from which these Haitians,
Nicaraguans, and Cubans fled.106 Recognizing that many HRIFA and
NACARA applicants would not qualify for asylum status for technical
legal reasons, even though they deserved the same relief as refugees,
Congress eliminated the barriers the applicants would face in qualify
ing for asylum status. For instance, NACARA and HRIFA applicants
are not required to prove that they would qualify for asylum, nor are
they required even to have applied for asylum since they arrived in the
United States.107 Additionally, Congress intended to avoid the long,
104. See supra Section 11.B (discussing Congress's intent to provide humanitarian immi
gration relief to NACARA and HRIFA applicants who fled refugee-like situations).
105. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 245.13(c) (1999), and 8 C.F.R. § 245.15(e)(2) (1999), with 8
u.s.c. § 1182(g) (1994).

106. Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immi
gration, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 35 (1998) (statement of Grover Joseph
Rees, former General Counsel of the INS) ("They came at a time when their country was
being ruled by a particularly brutal regime. In the words of President Clinton . . . 'They are
chopping people's faces off down there.' ). Speaking to this point, Senator Abraham stated:
"

[W)ith respect to Nicaraguans, . . . in the 1 980's , this country actively encouraged people
fearing persecution, fearing death squads, fearing disruptions of their communities to come
to America. Then we took extraordinary measures to make it feasible for them to stay here,
even those who had been denied asylum through the official asylum-seeking procedures.
143 CONG. REC. Sl0,199 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1997) (statement of Sen. Abraham).
107. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-277, Title IX (Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998), 112 Stat. 2681,
2681-538 (1998) (extending HRIFA eligibility to all Haitians who have been in the United
States continuously since December 31, 1995, whether or not they applied for asylum); Dis
trict of Columbia Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, Title II (Nicaraguan Adjustment
and Central American Relief Act), 111 Stat. 2160, 2194 (1997) (amended by Pub. L. No. 105139, 111 Stat. 2644 (1997)) (listing application for asylum as just one possible way for
NACARA applicants to prove that they have been continuously present in the United
States since December 1, 1995).
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expensive process of individualized assessment of each asylum appli
cation by the INS.108 Congress thereby bypassed the long waiting pe
riod asylum applicants face due to the backlog of asylum cases, so that
applicants gain immediate status and rights, which affects their right to
work and receive public assistance benefits.109
Congress enacted the Acts partly because there was no guarantee
that Nicaraguan, Cuban, and Haitian refugees who fled to the United
States would qualify for asylum status under the Refugee Act of
1980.110 The Refugee Act, which incorporates the international defini
tion of "refugee" from the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, requires asylum-seekers to show that there is a reasonable
possibility that they will be subject to serious human rights violations
on account of their race, religion, nationality, political opm1on, or
membership in a particular social group if returned to their home
country.111
Several elements of the refugee definition would be difficult for
many NACARA and HRIFA applicants to meet. One problem for
applicants would be showing that they faced a risk of "persecution" as
defined by asylum caselaw. Persecution is generally understood as a
serious human rights violation, most notably a threat to life or free
dom.112 Economic harm alone is usually not considered persecution,
and refugees who flee to escape economic deprivations or to improve
their living standards or chances for employment are typically denied
asylum.113 Many NACARA and HRIFA applicants, particularly

108. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Immigration of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 35 (1997) (statement of
Grover Joseph Rees, former General Counsel of the INS) ("(The HRIFA applicants'] asy
lum cases have taken years to adjudicate. They have built families here. Some have been
here 6 years.").
109. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Immigration of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 35 (1997) (statement of
Rep. Oiaz-Balart) ("[T]hese refugees filed asylum petitions, oftentimes during lengthy proc
essing times, for Immigration to evaluate their claims. . . . It is estimated that approximately
4,000 of these asylum claims are still pending."). The backlog of asylum cases reached over
400,000 in the 1990's. See Martin et al., supra note 93, at 552.
1 10. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scat
tered sections of 8 U.S.C.). Like NACARA and HRIFA, the Refugee Act appears in the
U.S. Code as amendments to the INA.
1 11. See supra note 63 (discussing the definition of "refugee"). See generally JAMES C.
HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 6-11 (1991). The Senate Judiciary Commit
tee's Report accompanying the Refugee Act of 1980 demonstrates Congress's intent to up
date the statutory definition of "refugee" to comport with the United States' international
treaty obligations. See H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 1 (1979).
1 12. See generally HATHAWAY, supra note 111, at 112-116 (characterizing "persecution"
as a serious violation of human rights).
1 13. See, e.g., Minwalla v. INS, 706 F.2d 831, 835 (8th Cir. 1983) ("Mere economic det
riment is not sufficient."). See also DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED
STATES 233-35 (3rd ed. 1999).
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Haitians, would have difficulty showing that the risk they faced was
beyond mere economic harm.114 A second problem for most Haitians,
Cubans, and Nicaraguans would be proving that they faced a risk of
persecution "on account of" one of the five reasons listed in the Con
vention.115 The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to require
an asylum applicant to provide direct or circumstantial evidence that
his persecutors were motivated to persecute him because of his race,
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular
social group.116 Thus, asylum applicants must make some showing of
their persecutors' intent to harm them, beyond a threat of indiscrimi
nate harm to the entire population.117 This persecutory intent require
ment would be difficult for many NACARA and HRIFA applicants,
whose fears were based on generalized poverty and violence.118
Through the Acts, Congress allowed applicants to bypass these asylum
requirements and provided a substitute for the difficult asylum proc
ess.119

114. See Harris, supra note 91, at 278-83 (1993) (discussing the difficulty Haitians have
qualifying for asylum under U.S. refugee law).
1 15. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42)(A) (1994) (incorporating the definition of "refugee" from
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees to require refugee applicants to
demonstrate "a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion").
116. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
117. See, e.g., Pedro-Mateo v. INS, 224 F.3d 1 147, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that
the facts "do not indicate that the Kanjobal Indians have been recruited because of their
race, political opinion, or any other protected ground. What they indicate, tragically, is that
wherever the guerillas clash with the Guatemalan Army, civilians are forcibly recruited by
both sides to serve in the conflict."); Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 970 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Peti
tioner still must demonstrate that the persecution she suffered was 'appreciably different'
from the hardships suffered by Indo-Fijians in general."); Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463,
1469 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding that the applicant's fear of harm must be "appreciably dif
ferent from the dangers faced by the alien's fellow citizens").
118. For a poignant example of an asylum applicant who feared the denial of her appli
cation, see Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Im
migration of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 28 (1997) (statement of
Louiciana Miclisse) (discussing the experiences that induced her to flee Haiti, namely the
military's murder of her father, and expressing her fear that she may not qualify for asylum
under U.S. law: "I understand that even though my parents were killed, my application for
asylum may be denied.").
119. See Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 35 (1997) (statement of
Grover Joseph Rees, former General Counsel of the INS):
The most important refugee protection law arguably, however, is not any of the specific
refugee laws, laws that have the word 'refugee' in their title. Rather, it is the Attorney Gen
eral's power to parole people into the country; that is to allow for their provisional entry,
even though no law specifically provides for their admission. . . . The refugee admission pro
cess is a complicated one. It can take months, or even years, and the problem is we can't al
ways plan for the existence of refugees. The only people who can plan for whether people
are going to be persecuted are the persecutors themselves. . . . The parole power is often bet
ter suited to that kind of quick reaction than the formal refugee admission process.
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Like NACARA and HRIFA, the Refugee Act was humanitarian
in purpose, based on the United States' duty of "non-refoulement,"
which prevents countries who are parties to the Refugee Convention
from sending refugees back to countries where they face persecu
tion.120 Unlike the Acts, Congress specified in the Refugee Act that
the waiver based on humanitarian purposes should be available to
HIV-positive refugees.121 Because the plain language of the Acts did
not indicate which waiver of the HIV exclusion was available to appli
cants, the INS had a choice in its regulations between the waiver avail
able for refugees and the waiver available for general immigrants. In
keeping with Congress's intent to grant NACARA and HRIFA appli
cants quasi-refugee relief, the INS should have copied the waiver ar
ticulated in the Refugee Act, as opposed to the waiver in the general
immigrant provisions of the INA.
Because the INS did not compare the purposes of the Acts to the
purposes of the Refugee Act, it did not follow the holistic approach to
determining Congress's intent that the Supreme Court has recom
mended. The INS's final rule and response to comments on HRIFA
indicates that it considered imitating the humanitarian waiver in the
Refugee Act, at least for HRIFA applicants, but rejected the idea.122
The agency read the humanitarian waiver available under the refugee
provision of the INA as applicable only to that section, not to aliens
applying for adjustment of status under other sections of the INA.123 In
doing so, the INS stratified the various adjustment of status provisions
in the INA and failed to utilize other sections of the INA for guidance
as to legislative intent behind NACARA and HRIFA. Thus, the INS
took a formalistic approach to interpreting the INA, instead of delving
into the substantive policy reasons behind the INA's various immigra
tion provisions.124 In filling the gap Congress left in NACARA and
Mr. Rees then went on to discuss the need for a more permanent solution to the parole
power, which NACARA and HRIFA provide.
120. See HATHAWAY, supra note 111, at 14 (defining "non-refoulement" as "the duty to
avoid the return of a refugee to a country where she faces a genuine risk of serious harm").
121. See 8 U.S.C. § 1 1 57(c)(3) (1994) (allowing refugees to apply to the Attorney Gen
eral for a discretionary waiver "for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it
is otherwise in the public interest").
122. See Adjustment of Status for Certain Nationals of Haiti, 65 Fed. Reg. 15,835, 15,837
(Mar. 24, 2000).
123. See id. :
When read in its entirety, it is clear that the waiver provision contained in [the refugee pro
vision] of the Act applies only to aliens who are adjusting status under that section, not to
aliens who are adjusting status under other provision of law, including HRIFA. The De
partment does not have the statutory authority to make this change. Accordingly, this sug
gestion cannot be adopted.

124. Professor Cass Sunstein supports granting greater latitude to administrative agen
cies to look beyond the formal text of a statute to implement Congress's policy choices: "As
against modem formalists, we might urge that administrative agencies should be authorized
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HRIF A, the agency had a duty to compare the humanitarian purpose
of NACARA and HRIFA to other immigration provisions motivated
by similar reasons (such as the Refugee Act) and give HIV-positive
applicants the opportunity to apply for the humanitarian waiver.
C.

The HIV Exclusion Under Other Special Immigration Measures

Congress intended the Acts to provide a permanent immigration
status similar to past ad hoc statutes that transformed temporary,
emergency immigration relief for groups of refugees fleeing particular
countries into permanent resident status. These laws, like NACARA
and HRIFA, represent Congress's decision that the United States
should not send these refugees back to their home countries for hu
manitarian reasons. As Senator Abraham stated in the subcommittee
hearing on HRIFA, the Acts were modeled after these ad hoc meas
ures.125 Because the Acts have a similar purpose and provide similar
relief to these special measures, the INS should have looked to the
HIV waiver available under them when crafting its regulations for
HIV-positive HRIFA and NACARA applicants.
Senator Abraham mentioned two recent examples of such ad hoc
immigration measures. The Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992
allowed Chinese students who had been involved in the Tiananmen
Square massacre and had subsequently been granted Deferred En
forced Departure ("DED") status to adjust their status to permanent
resident.126 Congress was motivated by both humanitarian and foreign
policy reasons, as in its consideration of NACARA and HRIFA.127
to reject the 'text' in situations where common law judges would not be so authorized, at
least when there is no evidence o f a considered legislative judgment against the agency's in
terpretation." Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L.
R EV. 636, 660 (1999).
125. See Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Immigration of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 3 (1997) (remarks o f Sen.
Abraham, chairman of the subcommittee):
Under U.S. law, one traditional way in which relatively large numbers of individuals paroled
into the country have gained permanent residence has been for Congress to pass a special
law that permits this to happen. . . . The relief accorded to asylum applicants and others from
Cuba and Nicaragua in this year's Central American relief bill is in that tradition as well. . . .
In the aftermath of the Tianenmen Square crackdown, Congress passed a law granting law
ful permanent residence to many of the Chinese nationals who were here in the United
States at that time . . . . In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibil
ity Act permitted Polish and Hungarian refugees admitted under the Attorney General's pa
role authority to apply for and gain permanent residence. U.S. immigration law, in my judg
ment, should not turn on arbitrary distinctions between members of different nationalities.

126. Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-404, 106 Stat. 1969. See
also THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, AND HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 1164 (4th ed. 1998); Martin et al.,
supra note 93, at 578.
127. See John D. Griffin, Comment, The Chinese Student Protection Act and "Enhanced
Consideration" for PRC Nationals: Legitimizing Foreign Policy while Averting False Posi
tives in Asylum Law, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1105, 1117-19 (1995) (citing congressional testi-
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Unlike HRIFA and NACARA, the Act enabled HIV-positive stu
dents to apply for the same humanitarian waiver of inadmissibility
available for refugees.128 Another recent immigration remedy that is
almost identical to NACARA and HRIFA was passed as part of
IIRIRA, and provides adjustment of status to permanent residence for
certain Polish and Hungarian nationals who were paroled into the
United States between 1989 and 1991 and were denied refugee
status.129 Congress intended this provision to amend a "bureaucratic
error" that prevented these people who had been paroled into the
country for humanitarian reasons years earlier from adjusting their
status to permanent resident.130 This law also contained the humani
tarian waiver of the HIV exclusion.
One might argue that because Congress explicitly indicated which
waiver should be available for HIV-positive applicants in both of the
above statutes, it would have done so in HRIFA and NACARA if it
had intended for a less stringent waiver to be available. But as was dis
cussed above, Congress did not mention waivers of inadmissibility at
all in HRIFA and NACARA, but merely indicated which grounds of
inadmissibility were completely waived. Because the plain language of
the Act did not answer the waiver question, the INS was left with the
responsibility of determining which waiver Congress intended. Since
the above statutes are similar to HRIFA and NACARA in terms of
the type of relief they provide and Congress's reasons for enacting
them, Chevron requires the INS to look to the HIV waivers under
these statutes rather than the general adjustment of status provision of
the INA. To be consistent with congressional intent, the INS should
have allowed HIV-positive applicants under HRIFA and NACARA
to apply for the more accessible waiver of the HIV exclusion.
This Part argued that the INS, in requiring HIV-positive HRIFA
and NACARA applicants to apply for a waiver based on a family rela
tionship to a United States citizen or permanent resident, contradicted
Congress's intent. By analogizing the type of relief granted and the
mony that the "deeper purpose" of the legislation was the promotion of democracy and capi
talism and the condemnation of communism). Griffin emphasizes the discriminatory effect
of Congress's favorable treatment of Chinese students compared to its negative response to
Haitians fleeing the military coup of 1991. Id. at 1120, 1158-60.
128. Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-404 § 2(a)(3)(B), 106 Stat.
1969 (specifying the availability of a waiver to the public health exclusion based on humani
tarian reasons, family unity, or public interest).
129. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-709.
130. See 142 CONG. REC. Hll,081 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (Statement of Rep. Hyde)
(speaking in support of the Conference Report on IIRIRA):
This omnibus legislation includes a number of miscellaneous provisions that are responsive
to a range of problems . . . . We also recognize the equities of certain nationals of Poland and
Hungary who were paroled into the United States years ago - and thus entered our country
legally - by affording them an opportunity to adjust to permanent resident status.
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purposes of the Acts to other immigration provisions, the INS should
have recognized that Congress intended HRIFA and NACARA to be
more like refugee status and other special immigration statutes rather
than adjustment of status for general immigrants. To carry out legisla
tive intent, the INS should have copied the waiver in these special im
migration provisions, based on humanitarian purposes, rather than the
waiver for general immigrants.
CONCLUSION

Congress enacted the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central
American Relief Act of 1997 and the Haitian Refugee Immigration
Fairness Act of 1998 to provide permanent immigration remedies to
refugees fleeing inhumane situations in countries toward which the
United States has long demonstrated a foreign policy commitment.
The HIV exclusion of immigrants was enacted primarily for financial
reasons, while Congress's purpose behind HRIFA and NACARA was
primarily humanitarian. The INS, charged with developing regulations
to further congressional mandates, should have recognized that Con
gress intended these Acts to be similar to the Refugee Act and other
special immigration measures, and allowed HIV-positive applicants to
obtain a waiver based on humanitarian purposes. Because the INS did
not follow Congress's clear intent or, in the alternative, did not inter
pret Congress's purposes reasonably, the waiver regulation should be
vacated by courts or voluntarily changed by the INS. Alternatively,
Congress should pass an amendment to the Acts that specifies that the
humanitarian waiver is available for HIV-positive applicants. These
reforms are necessary to fulfill Congress's goal of providing wide
spread immigration relief to refugees from Haiti, Cuba, and
Nicaragua.

